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Panpsychism in the West, by David Skrbina. MIT Press, 2005 Pp. 314. $35.00 
(Cloth).
W. J. MANDER, Harris Manchester College, Oxford
In this interesting and useful book, David Skrbina aims to demonstrate 
that panpsychism, far from an outrageous and absurd view found in only 
a handful of thinkers, is in fact a position which has been widely held 
throughout the history of philosophy, and by some of its most eminent 
fi gures. This claim is entirely correct and, in tracing its appearance from 
ancient philosophy through to the present day he successfully establishes 
his thesis. 
The book is very ambitious; its vast sweep amounts almost to a 
complete history of Western philosophy, as it uncovers varying types 
and degrees of panpsychism in (among others) the presocratics, Plato, 
Aristotle, the Hellenic philosophers, the renaissance, the early modern 
period, the vitalistic materialism of eighteenth century French thought 
and the German romantic movement, continuing through to such fi gures 
as Josiah Royce and William James in the nineteenth century, and Henry 
Bergson and A. N. Whitehead in the twentieth. The study ends with what 
is in eﬀ ect a literature survey of the past fi ft y years or so as he notes how 
the problem of emergence in the philosophy of mind has lead several 
modern philosophers, for example Thomas Nagel and Galen Strawson, 
to reconsider this long unfashionable view. In all this, Skrbina has done 
the history of philosophy a useful service, for it is perhaps inevitable that 
the historical canon of “great philosophers” both contracts and stagnates, 
but if our sense of our own history is to refl ect more than our own igno-
rance and prejudice it is vital that the full range of past thoughts be kept 
open. For this reason his discussions of fi gures interesting in their own 
right, and once held in high regard, but now largely forgott en—fi gures 
such as William Gilbert, Joseph Priestly, Gustav Fechner, Herman Lotze, 
or Samuel Alexander (to name but a few)—are all extremely welcome.
The book is not without its weaknesses, however, many of which stem 
from its sheer scope. Given that he covers so much ground in only three 
hundred–odd pages all of the discussions are very brief, but such thumb-
nail sketches can have only limited value; at best they are tantalisingly 
incomplete while at worst they can be seriously misleading. For this rea-
son the book is best thought of as a useful sourcebook for those seeking an 
introductory sketch of some of the less travelled regions of the history of 
philosophy (and in this respect it should be noted that it is well referenced) 
rather than a work of detailed interpretative scholarship in that history.
In this survey everyone gets a few lines and is thereby made to seem 
equally important, but one consequence of that is that key fi gures in 
the subject which one might reasonably expect would receive detailed 
discussion, in fact get badly short-changed. For example, surely a his-
tory of pantheism should contain a substantial analysis of Spinoza, but 
all we are oﬀ ered is a handful of pages presenting the relevant textual 
evidence followed by a mere list of those commentators who think Spi-
noza is a pantheist and those who are inclined to deny this. Similarly, by 
any adequate standards, the precise determination of Leibniz’s view is 
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a complex triangulation between idealism, pan-organicism and panpsy-
chism, which needs must take into account the issue of to what extent, if 
any, his views evolved. But none of this emerges from Skrbina’s briefest 
of reports of his monadism.
But if some fi gures get less space than they deserve, several get rather 
more. While agreeing with his basic thesis, it seemed to this reader that the 
pudding was rather over-egged, as though the author could hardly bear to 
admit that there had been any great philosophers of the past who weren’t 
panpsychists. Since the swerve of atoms does not necessarily imply they 
are animate, the world-soul is not itself composed of many subsidiary 
souls, and teleology in nature is not the same thing as mental purpose, 
the case for including Democritus, Plato and Aristotle is at best doubtful. 
Certainly it would require much more argument than is given to really 
make the case. But if these inclusions are moot, others have no rightful 
place at all. For example, Locke is included simply because at one point 
in the Essay he says it is no contradiction to suppose that God might have 
annexed to certain systems of senseless matt er the power to think (p. 92), 
while a passage from the Critique is taken to suggest that Kant toyed with 
the idea that if the nouminal nature of matt er is unknown it may well be of 
the same type as that of mind whose inner essence is known (p. 110). This 
seems as tenuously relevant to panpsychism as it is mistaken about Kant.
To complain of lack of depth in a work of such broad sweep might 
seem churlish, for no doubt there is room in the history of ideas for wide 
panoramic sketches. However, the justifi cation for such broad-brush 
approaches lies in the narrative they can spin, and here too Skrbina’s work 
fails to deliver all that it might have done. This is partly because it is unclear 
what all the diﬀ erent positions which he locates really have in common. 
By his understanding a view counts as panpsychist if “however one con-
ceives of mind, such mind applies to all things” (p. 2). But to say all things 
possess life, anima, soul, consciousness, purpose, will, rationality, experi-
ence or mind are each quite diﬀ erent claims. To be sure at no point does 
Skrbina deny this, but the very fact of grouping them together in a single 
narrative implies a certain commonality, and this is insuﬃ  ciently defended 
or explained. Although he begins with a useful list of related but diﬀ erent 
philosophical positions, such as animism, pansensism, pantheism, and the 
like (pp. 19–22), and his last chapter gives a helpful nine-fold taxonomy of 
argument-types he has located for the view (p. 250), there is no classifi ca-
tion of the varying diﬀ erent types of panpsychism or consideration of how 
they all relate to each other. We are given no sense of evolving or developing 
themes within the mass of data he uncovers.
This vagueness leads to confusion. For example, he defi nes panpsy-
chism in individualistic terms as the view that each individual thing, for 
itself, enjoys experience or possesses mind-like being (pp. 16, 39). But this 
defi nition does not stop him from bringing in as relevant pantheistic sys-
tems or monistic philosophies which att ribute mentality to the whole uni-
verse. For example, in recruiting Spinoza as a panpsychist, suggestions of a 
contradicting pantheism are dismissed in a sentence with the claim that for 
Spinoza, God or nature is in no sense a person (p. 88). To be sure, Spinoza 
says things in this vein, but he says many others of quite opposite import, 
and simply to leave matt ers like that is dangerously misleading. Similarly, 
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Schopenhauer fi nds a place in the list of pantheists without proper consid-
eration of whether his Will, enjoying as it does a nouminal existence be-
yond space and time, can really be said to be individuated in each creation 
as the proposed defi nition of pantheism would require. Even St. Francis of 
Assisi, we are told, was a pantheist because “he saw the presence of God 
in all parts of nature, and thus he viewed all things as enspirited beings” 
(p. 61). But the second by no means follows from the fi rst, at least not in the 
sense of panpsychism.
Skrbina’s interest in panpsychism is not merely historical; he thinks the 
doctrine has received an unfair press. And in his last chapter he takes some 
fi rst steps towards its defence. He locates a number of arguments that have 
been made against it in recent years, to which he oﬀ ers responses. But once 
again the list of sources is more useful than the discussion, for his replies 
are too short to be of much service. For example, in response to an objec-
tion proposed by Colin McGinn to the eﬀ ect that panpsychists do not really 
escape the problem of emergence since they must account for the diﬀ er-
ent levels of mind associated with organic and inorganic matt er, Skrbina 
simply says that panpsychists can allow levels of emergence rejecting only 
radical emergence (p. 260). While this is right, and perhaps even defensible, 
it raises deep questions about the real nature of the puzzle of emergence 
and the real diﬀ erence between panpsychism and its rivals, diﬃ  cult and 
potentially explosive issues which deserve more than three sentences.
While lack of space would be a suﬃ  cient reason for not gett ing into 
close consideration of the details of panpsychism, or assessment of the 
arguments for and against it, that seems not to be the real reason for the 
absence of such detailed discussion in this book. For in the last two chap-
ters Skrbina reveals his view that panpsychism is a “worldview” and 
therefore that to think of it as true or not is to hold “a very restricted and 
almost naive form of realism” (p. 233). As though the materialist and the 
panpsychist are locked in competing Kuhnian paradigms, he asserts that 
there is no neutral perspective from which to speak of such positions or 
judge between them (pp. 17–18, 269). Yet in this absurd conclusion he 
fails spectacularly to learn the lesson of his own book, for one of the most 
striking things about the pantheistic philosophers he uncovers is precisely 
that they were philosophically engaged with their contemporaries. They 
fi t seemlessly into the rest of the history of philosophy In the end it seems 
Skrbina’s allegiance to pantheism stems from the fact that it leads to “a 
more integrated, compassionate and sympathetic cosmos” (p. 268); that 
it sustains a perspective of positive values in which humanity fi nds itself 
in harmony with its environment, in contrast to the “isolating” and “ma-
nipulative” value system associated with materialism. But neither is this 
position adequately defended, for despite claiming that panpsychism has 
important axiological consequences (4), and listing numerous other think-
ers who believe so too (pp. 223–34), the claim is never really proved. Yet 
it needs proof, for prima facie, for there is no contradiction whatsoever in 
holding that, despite a continuity between the highest forms of life and 
all other existence, value itself emerges in and pertains only to its highest 
form. Such indeed seems to have been the view of Samuel Alexander, al-
though Skrbina’s account of his thought is too brief to take in his doctrine 
of “tertiary qualities” (pp. 165–67).
